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PLANTINGA'S BOX
William Lad Sessions

Plantinga's Box is an (imaginary) epistemic engine that can alter a person's
cognitive condition in various ways. Its present use is to conduct a thoughtexperiment exploring some questions of religious pluralism as they arise for
someone who believes that his or her Christian beliefs are properly basic.
The central questions are these: Would it be wrong for a 'properly basic
Christian' to use the Box to acquire some properly basic non-Christian religious beliefs? Are there good reasons for such a person to use the Box for
this purpose? Various considerations pro and con are sifted; the result points
toward interreligious dialogue and inquiry.

Notoriously, there are in this world Christians and non-Christians, and
some of the latter are Buddhists or Muslims or Jews. In this paper I wish to
explore a few of the difficulties this notoriety raises for Christians who hold,
like Alvin Plantinga,t that some of their Christian beliefs are properly basic.
My contentions-formulated by way of a bizarre thought-experiment-are
that there are no real obstacles, and there may be real incentives, for many
properly basic Christians to engage in serious interreligious inquiry.
I confine my discussion throughout to properly basic religious beliefs,2
even though many of my considerations might be applied more widely, for
three reasons: (1) Such beliefs-some of them at any rate-seem to be quite
important for many people. Beliefs such as belief in God (which Plantinga
argues can be properly basic for some persons) reverberate throughout many
persons' noetic structures, are typically held with deeply passionate and enduring conviction, and are valued far beyond many other beliefs. (2) Their
possession seems to create uniquely strong obstacles to interreligious dialogue. If someone has properly basic religious beliefs, then there seems to be
no need, desire, positive reason, nor even legitimate opportunity to inquire
into the apparently incompatible religious beliefs of others, even when those
other beliefs are properly basic for them. (3) The problems of interreligious
dialogue are complicated enough when only properly basic beliefs are considered; the introduction of other kinds of epistemic states and conditions is
beyond the scope of this paper.
I.

Imagine, if you will, an epistemic engine I will call 'Plantinga's Box. '3
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This machine is a device which can alter a cognitive system-such as yours
or mine-in a number of ways I shall shortly describe. Since a cognitive
system can be represented, to a first level of approximation, as a set of beliefs,
we may think of Plantinga's Box as a Doxastic Deviation Device, a beliefaltering machine.
Output electrodes from Plantinga's Box connect comfortably to your temples; input is from another person's similarly-wired skull. The Box's inner
hardware and software are trade secrets, but that matters little; all we need
to know is what sort of work it does. The Box has a distressingly high-tech
keyboard replete with dials, knobs, toggles, keys, levers and buttons, only
some of which can be mentioned here: The ADD button, of course, adds a
new belief, while DELETE does just that. REPLACE deletes one belief and
adds another, thereby conveniently replacing the former with the latter. SUSPEND retains (or produces) awareness of a proposition p but blocks belief
that p. COPY adds one person's beliefs to the belief-set of another person
with or without deleting the first person's beliefs; it can be adjusted to "piecemeal," "wholesale" or "generic" copying-the last is where it copies one
person's beliefs of a certain kind into another person. META is an interesting
knob; in connection with other functions it enables the beliefs altered to be
about other beliefs, so that certain kinds of cognitive structure can appear (or
disappear). Then there is the important MEMORY dial: when a belief is
deleted it allows one to remember (more or less clearly and distinctly) that
one once had that belief; when a belief is added, it lets one remember (more or
less) that one once lacked that belief; and similarly with suspension and other
operations. There are also calibration for remembering not only which beliefs
one once had or lacked, but that one had acquired or lost them in such-and-such
a manner (e.g., via Plantinga's Box), at such-and-such a time, and had held
them with such-and-such a degree of confidence, and believed them to imply
and be implied by various other beliefs, etc. -But I really must stop describing
this marvelous machine, or we will never get around to using it. 4
I want to use Plantinga's Box in the following thought-experiment. Imagine
two people, Al and Go. Al (short for" Alvin") is a Christian of a Plantingan
cast-Le., he not only has some set of beliefs which are ChristianS, but he
also thinks that some of these Christian beliefs are properly basic-basic,
because not believed on the basis of any other beliefs, and properly basic,
because "it is entirely right, rational, reasonable and proper" so to believe in
the basic way.6 Further, Al is not a narrow sectarian who thinks that only his
sort of Christian beliefs can be properly basic for someone. This is because
he holds both that religious beliefs are not the only kind of beliefs that can
be properly basic, and that within the class of religious beliefs there may well
be some non-Christian beliefs which are properly basic for someone else,
even though they are not properly basic, or basic, or even beliefs, for AI.
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Go (short for "Gotama"), on the other hand, is a Buddhist, Le. he has a set
of Buddhist beliefs, some of which, we may imagine, are properly basic for
him. It is not necessary that Go be a Plantingan about these property basic
beliefs-Le., one who believes that these beliefs are properly basic for him.
It suffices for our purposes that these beliefs are properly basic for GO.7
Our experimental setup is as follows: We are going to arrange for the
manipulation and exchange of properly basic beliefs only.s Since Go is to be
the source and Al the recipient of the properly basic beliefs in question, input
electrodes are attached to Go and output ones to AI. Go will not be affected
in any way by the experiment-save for a minor headache the morning
after-so let us assume that he consents to the experiment as soon as he learns
that AI's current properly basic beliefs will not be altered without AI's consent and that, by the way, he (Go) will receive $200 even if Al passes. But
AI's situation is more interesting, for there are at least six options for him to
consider, as illustrated by the following diagrams. Each line represents a
subset of AI's properly basic religious beliefs, with 'CR' labelling his Christian ones and 'BD' his Buddhist ones; double lines indicate AI's actual belief
at a time, single lines represent his memory at one time of actual belief at an
earlier time (which earlier time will be evident), and dotted lines represent
no belief at that time:
to
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(1) At t,-when Plantinga's Box begins to work-AI loses all his (properly
basic) Christian beliefs and gains Go's set of Buddhist ones; at t2 (following
an appropriate duration, which can be varied) Al loses any Buddhist beliefs
he retains at that moment and regains all of his previous Christian beliefs;
and thereafter he has no memory of the amazing exchange between t, and h.
(2) At t, Al gains Go's set of Buddhist beliefs but does not lose his Christian
ones; at h Al loses all his acquired Buddhist beliefs while still preserving his
Christian ones; and again thereafter he has no memory of the strange interlude.
(3) At t" as in (1), Al loses his Christian, and gains Go's Buddhist, beliefs;
at h, again as in (1), Al regains his Christian, and loses his (Le., Go's)
Buddhist, beliefs; but thereafter, unlike (1), he retains the memories of having
had Go's Buddhist beliefs and of having lacked his own Christian ones
between t, and h.
(4) At t" as in (2), Al gains Go's Buddhist beliefs without losing his own
Christian ones; at t2 Al loses the former while retaining the latter; but this
time he thereafter remembers having had both Christian and Buddhist beliefs
during that (wonderful? awful? bizarre?) time between tl and h.
(5) At t" as in (1), Al loses his Christian and gains Go's Buddhist beliefs;
but at h he retains the Buddhist beliefs while regaining his former Christian
beliefs; and thereafter he continues to hold both Buddhist and Christian
beliefs-at least to the extent that he can continue to hold them both (and
this is a psychological and not an epistemic 'can ').
(6) At tlo as in (2), Al gains Go's Buddhist beliefs without losing his own
Christian ones; but at h he retains both sets, and similarly thereafter-once
again subject to whatever constraints internal to Al there are for keeping both
sets.
Now of course, as you will have noticed, there is obviously a seventh option
beyond these six9 :
(7) Al may simply strip off the electrodes at the very outset and refuse to
participate in our crazy experiment, preferring to retain intact his present
cognitive system.
This seventh option is just the one I would like to compare with the previous
six, asking in every case two questions: First, would it be wrong for Al to
pick any option but number seven-i.e., would it be wrong for Al to use the
Box to add (and maybe retain) some properly basic Buddhist beliefs? Second,
would it be wrong for Al not to choose one of the six options over his present
belief-condition-Le. are there good reasons for Al to use the Box?lO

II.
Immediately, some preliminary problems arise. First, an ambiguity: What
does 'wrong' mean here-wrong in what sense? In sections III-V below I
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consider a raft of putative "wrongs" under three headings-epistemic, moral
and religious ones-but doubtless there are other ways to parse the term, and
difficult borderline cases in any parsing.
Second, some technical difficulties: Do we have any right to assume that
Plantinga's Box will work as advertised? What if, e.g., beliefs cannot be
simply acquired or lost without also acquiring or losing the associated language, concepts, emotions, attitudes, experiences, etc.? In particular, since
S's belief that p is properly basic only if p is grounded for S,1I the transfer
or infusion of beliefs as properly basic requires concurrent transfer or infusion of the associated grounds. 12 Very well then, we will just have to purchase,
or invent, an additional fancy machine or two-certainly an experience-inducing one, and perhaps also a language-altering machine, a concept-changing one, and so on. This will be expensive (in time and inventiveness, if not
in money), and it will enormously clutter the basically trim lines of our initial
doxastic engine, so I hope we don't have to worry about such additional
machines here. Fortunately, so far as I can see, nothing essential about our
experiment seems to depend upon such complications.
Worse, however: What if there is something (obscurely) logically impossible in the very idea of such a Doxastic Deviation Device? Well, certainly
such a machine is technically beyond our reach (though not perhaps beyond
our wildest dreams, like this one), but why should it be logically impossible?
After all, we do seem to learn and/orget-and what's that but acquiring and
losing beliefs? Moreover, something very much like exchange of religious
properly basic beliefs seems to occur in episodes of conversion. And surely
we remember or forget our doxastic gains and losses; that's life. Therefore,
since something like what Plantinga's Box is supposed to engineer does
occur, let the Box do the same, only much more quickly and cheaply.
Finally, and perhaps most seriously, isn't the Box simply otiose? Isn't the
central concern in a context of religious pluralism simply to understand the
beliefs of others,13 not to come to have or hold them? Isn't understanding a
belief independent of believing it?14 My response, in brief, is that while a
certain kind or level of understanding of a belief can be had without having
the belief, still there is a kind, degree or depth of understanding that can only
be obtained through believing it, and this latter kind of understanding is
important in the context of religious pluralism.
What, after all, is it to understand a belief?lS In addition to comprehending
the syntax of the sentence expressing the belief, understanding a belief also
involves knowing the meaning of its constituent concepts, knowing at least
most of its major implications, and perhaps knowing what grounds would
justify someone in holding the belief in a properly basic way. But apparently
all this knowledge can be obtained without actually holding the belief in
question, though arguably no one could hold a belief without knowing at least
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most of these things. Now, even were this all that understanding a belief
involves, Plantinga's Box would still be useful. Given Go's properly basic
belief that p, the Box could at least supply Al with true properly basic beliefs
about p's syntax, meaning, implications and grounds-all without necessarily
giving Al the belief that p. And perhaps this is all the understanding Al needs
or wants.
But there would be something lacking-something vital, a certain depthin all this "understanding." One could imagine Go saying to a suitably-informed AI: "You certainly do understand a lot about my beliefs-perhaps
even more about them in certain respects than I do-but you still don't really
understand my beliefs, because you don't realize or appreciate what it is like
to see the world in terms of those beliefs.16 You are looking through your
beliefs at my beliefs, not through my beliefs at the world. You therefore
understand something of the beliefs I hold but not what it is like to believe
them, and hence you have not yet fully understood my beliefs as I hold them.
But to understand my beliefs in this way, you must believe them." More
generally: To deeply understand S's belief that p, one must understand what
it is like for S to believe that p, and to this end no amount of beliefs or
knowledge about p or S or S's relation to p can substitute for actually believing that p.17 Additionally, understanding what believing something is like
seems to involve a certain kind of "know-how" (or "understanding-how")
which is not reducible to knowledge that or about, and arguably to have such
know-how is to have the belief in question. 18
Moreover, achieving this deeper kind, level or degree of understanding
seems vital in the context of religious pluralism, for at least two reasons: (1)
Religious beliefs are typically more personally involving than non-religious
ones, and understanding self-involving beliefs presses towards sharing those
beliefs. 19 (2) Religious concepts are typically vague and open-textured, so
that their application and use involves considerable skill and know-how; since
this know-how is usually learned only through long and attentive participation in a religious community, its acquisition may be inextricable from the
acquisition of the associated beliefs. Hence, for both reasons, if there is to
be interreligious understanding at a sufficiently deep level, something very
much like the production of actual beliefs-as opposed to beliefs about beliefs-seems necessary and desirable. So it is that I have programmed
Plantinga's Box to 'copy' beliefs from Go to AI.
III.

Now if, as I have argued, there are good reasons to think that Plantinga's
Box can be made to work and that its function of producing beliefs is indispensable for achieving an important kind of interreligious understanding, let
us go on to consider some of the major reasons Al might have for thinking
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that he would do wrong to prefer any of our first six options over quitting
the experiment.
First, three epistemic reasons: It seems that Al will lose truth, overload his
cognitive system, and violate the conditions of proper basicality.
(A-I) In acquiring a new properly basic belief it is possible to lose the truth
one already has, and this might seem to violate our epistemic duty not to
deliberately lose whatever truth we may possess.
But, even assuming that AI's current properly basic beliefs are true, this
duty does not prohibit use of the Box, because there are important qualifications to the duty: We are permitted to lose some truth while pursuing or
gaining other truth if truth gained outweighs or compensates for truth lost,
or if the odds are very good that we will improve our store of truth. 20 Hence
at least several of the options open to Al are not necessarily wrong. By adding
new properly basic beliefs without subtracting old ones, they set up a kind
of internal doxastic market or competition. There is no guarantee, of course,
that such competition wiIl always yield good results. 21 StilI, it does seem the
best chance we have of gaining or ascertaining the truth using our own noetic
mechanisms. If so, then Al may be right to risk whatever loss of truth using
the Box involves, so long as he will be-or at any rate justifiably believes
that he will be-adequately alethica11y compensated.
(A-2) One might simply overload one's finite cognitive system by acquiring
more beliefs-or more complicated or complexly related beliefs-than one
can handle. The system might fail to register certain crucial beliefs, might
distort others, or might just crash. After all, how many beliefs can a finite
human mind contain? In particular, how many different or even contradictory
properly basic beliefs can one person tolerate within herself?
I think that these are valid questions, but they are not insuperable obstacles
to using the Box. Even though I have raised these questions in an apriori
way, I do not think that they can be settled by apriori arguments; they are
empirical questions, which can (in principle) be answered only on the basis
of actual experience, such as that which the Box provides.
(A-3) Most importantly, it seems that use of the Box violates the conditions
under which a belief is properly basic. The argument goes something like
this: To believe in the properly basic way is to be entirely within one's rational
rights in so believing. But if it is right so to believe p then it is wrong to believe
not-p (whether basically or not) while continuing to believe p. Moreover, it is
wrong deliberately to set about to believe not-p or to cease to believe p.
Furthermore, it is wrong to do these things even when one (knows that one)
would come to believe not-p in the properly basic way at some later time and
when so believing would be a good thing (e.g., because p is false).22 So even
if the outcome of using Plantinga's Box would be a good thing, it would be
wrong to use the Box to achieve that outcome. Hence it seems that one can
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never be justified in seeking deliberately to delete or subvert a properly basic
belief.23 Using the Box seems not only unjustified but prohibited.
But the force of this worry is blunted by the following considerations. First,
the differences among religions need not involve outright logical inconsistencies among properly basic beliefs-where, say, a Christian properly basically believes and a Buddhist properly basically disbelieves the very same
proposition. And if the differences are not formal inconsistencies but more
like apparent incoherencies or incommensurabilities24 , then the worry seems
less a prohibition and more a warning.
Second, there may be an inconsistency but one doesn't see it in advance.
Hence one might come to believe that not-p in a properly non-basic way
because, unbeknownst to one, it is the logical consequence of other beliefs
which one acquires in the properly basic way, and these beliefs subsequently
produce or enable belief that not-po
Third, even if there is an inconsistency which one recognizes, one need not
deliberately seek it. Instead, while pursuing something else, or even while
merely considering or entertaining not-p, one may end up with the inconsistent beliefs as an unsought side-consequence. But then there may be something like an epistemic principle of double effect: Perhaps one is justified in
acquiring a properly basic belief, even though acquiring this belief has the
foreseen or likely but unintended result that one also acquires inconsistent
properly basic beliefs. 25
Fourth, a person who believes that belief in p is properly basic for her and
that belief in not-p is properly basic for someone else is in a peculiar, and
possibly unstable, situation. Her belief that both beliefs, though inconsistent,
are nonetheless equally rational may well move her in one of two directions:
(i) She may question the rationality of his-or perhaps even the rationality
of her own-beliefs, finding it hard to believe that both could be equally
rational. (ii) She may question a conception of rationality that permits beliefs
to be rationally justified for one person independently of (and indeed contrary
to) the rational justification which others' beliefs have. Either movement will
weaken the argument from proper basicality against using the Box. 26
I conclude, therefore, that epistemic scruples need not prevent Al from
trying on the electrodes, except perhaps in the (unlikely?) event that he knows
that one of Go's properly basic beliefs is logically inconsistent with one of
his own current properly basic beliefs.

IV.
Next, we turn to some moral reasons for avoiding the Box: It seems that
Boxing will undermine AI's autonomy, sanity and motives.
(B-1) Plantinga's Box might enslave Al by destroying his autonomy, rendering him a helpless hypnotic unable to resist the Box's manipulations of
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his doxastic system. Surely it would be morally wrong to choose to lose one's
autonomy in this way.
However, I doubt the Box would have such deleterious effects, for Al would
retain, in addition to his normal powers of deliberation and choice, all of his
previous doxastic capacities. Once a belief, even a properly basic belief, is
added by the Box, it is thereafter subject to removal or alteration by ordinary
epistemic processes such as comparison with other beliefs, argument, testimony, forgetting, etc. So Al would be as epistemically free after the Box's
operation as he was before-if not somewhat freer, since with the Box he
could decide in advance which beliefs he wanted, or how his doxastic system
should be transformed. Of course with epistemic freedom comes a certain
unpredictability. After the Box cuts off there is no guarantee that its additions
or alterations will remain, nor that its excisions will not return. In particular
Al cannot predict whether after h, when he is introduced to Go's properly
basic Buddhist beliefs-or they to him-he will continue as a Christian, will
become a Buddhist, or will embrace or be driven to some third position. It
all depends on the complicated inner adjustments of his cognitive system to
the new beliefs, as well as on AI's further experience (itself in part a function
of his new beliefs). But whatever the result it doesn't seem that AI's autonomy
would necessarily be 10st.27
(B-2) It might cost Al too much to gain Go's beliefs, where the "costs" are
not so much time, energy and money (after all, the Box, like any imaginary
device, is quick and cheap), but rather the confusion, trauma, incoherence,
or insanity that might result from holding inconsistent, incompatible or at
least vastly heterogeneous properly basic beliefs. 28 It seems morally wrong
to purchase even important truth at such a personal cost.
But, once again, there are mitigations, because there are other possible, or
likely, results: For some people it might be quite exciting, interesting or at
any rate tolerable to entertain such wildly disparate beliefs; for others the
hope or determination of winning through to new truth or to a deeper level
of understanding might carry them through almost any chaos. So if a moral
prohibition is involved, it would seem to be quite person-relative. Moreover,
possessing the kind of important truth involved in religion would seem to
matter more than being contented or clear-headed. So the psychological costs
do not necessarily or decisively count against AI's trying the experiment.
(B-3) What possible motives could Al have for wanting to acquire Buddhist
beliefs? Wouldn't the likeliest candidates be casual curiosity, intellectual
voyeurism and self-insecurity? Aren't such motives morally reprehensible-a
betrayal of AI's religious community and tradition?
But these rhetorical questions are inconclusive. Some, perhaps many, persons no doubt will have such discreditable motives, but some will not, and
no one need have them, for there are perfectly legitimate reasons which might
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inspire one to tryout the Box: to seek truth, to want to know and love another
person, to hope to understand another person's religious doxastic system, to
desire a different perspective on and deeper understanding of one's own
beliefs, and so on.
So the moral reasons, like the epistemic ones, do not necessarily make it
wrong for Al to try the Box.

v
Finally, we tum to some religious reasons for not Boxing, which, since Al
is a Christian, I will limit to a few clearly Christian reasons rooted in Scripture (I will comment on them later):
(C-l) Venturing beyond the truth which God has provided seems but to
repeat Adam and Eve's original sin of disobedience: "You may eat from every
tree in the garden, but not from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil;
for on the day that you eat from it, you will certainly die" (Gen. 2: 16b-17,
NEB). God, not Plantinga's Box, should provide whatever properly basic
beliefs, and everything else, humans need-and all of what they need-for
their own good.
(C-2) If Jesus Christ truly is "the way, the truth and the life" and "no one
comes to the Father but by me" (In. 14:6, RSV), then any attempt to "tryon"
other properly basic beliefs would seem to be a form of apostasy, seeking
saving truth apart from where it can alone be found, just where God provides
it.
(C-3) Acquiring non-Christian properly basic beliefs, with the possible loss
of distinctively Christian beliefs, seems to violate St. Paul's admonition to
"guard the truth that has been entrusted to you by the Holy Spirit who dwells
within us" (2Tim. 1:14, RSV).
(C-4) The risen Christ commanded his disciples to "Go forth to every part
of the world, and proclaim the Good News to the whole creation. Those who
believe it and receive baptism will find salvation; those who do not believe
will be condemned" (Mk. 16:15-16, NEB; cf. Mt. 28:19). A follower of Christ
would be disobedient if instead of, or in addition to, believing and proclaiming the Good News he believed and proclaimed the Four Noble Truths and
trod the Eightfold Noble Path. 29
For some properly basic Christians such considerations may well suffice
for saying "no" to our little thought-experiment. But not for all, for there are
strong Christian reasons to use the Box.
To seek important truth insofar as we can is a Christian as well as an
epistemic and moral duty. Of course there are qualifications. One should not
seek truth at the sacrifice of truth of comparable quantity or quality; one
should not harm oneself in doing so, or at least not more seriously than one
stands to benefit self or others; and one should not fail in other, equally
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weighty or weightier duties. But when these qualifications are observed, the
duty to seek truth seems to count strongly in favor of using Plantinga's Box
at least to 'inquire' into the religious beliefs of others.
Moreover, truth is one-at least in the sense that any two true beliefs must
be consistent. 30 That truth is one in this sense should be unproblematic to an
orthodox Christian for whom God is one and God is truth. So Al has nothing
to fear (from the standpoint of truth) in acquiring others' properly basic
beliefs which he does not know in advance to be inconsistent with his current
budget of properly basic beliefs. If no inconsistency results from the acquisition, truth has been added-or at least no truth has been lost-and there is
no bar to having more. But if inconsistency does result, there might still be
progress if Al does not (yet) know which belief, old or new, is false; at least
he would then know where to focus his attention pi
What if, even though there is some truth in the properly basic beliefs of
others, Al believes his own beliefs 'suffice unto salvation'? Would there be
any point for him to acquire those other beliefs? Not if the truth others believe
is only a (proper) subset of AI's own, for then AI's true beliefs are not only
sufficient for him but also (at least in part) necessary for others. But what if
the soteriological situation is symmetrical-what if others' true beliefs suffice for them just as AI's own true beliefs suffice for him? In such a case,
seeing others' true beliefs 'from the inside' might at least lead Al to two
important, and tolerance-tending, truths: (i) that the beliefs sufficient for
oneself need not be necessary for another, and (ii) that the sufficiency of
another's beliefs need not exclude the sufficiency of one's own.
Of course, Ai might remain convinced that his current set of true beliefsperhaps encapsulated in his properly basic beliefs-is alone salvific. Still,
even so, the Box could be useful: by learning about another's properly basic
beliefs-without necessarily believing them-one could, e.g., come to know
her more intimately, thereby being inspired to know her more lovingly as
well as enabled to love her more knowingly.
Finally, it is part and parcel of many Christians' trust in the final veracity,
steadfastness and goodness of God to believe that God's truth can and will
be found wherever it is sought (cf. Mt. 7:7)-perhaps even in the properly
basic beliefs of Buddhists! Clinging obstinately to one's current set of properly basic beliefs may therefore be idolatry, substituting faith in proper
basicality for faith in God.
I conclude that AI's specifically Christian reasons need not prohibit-and
may in fact suggest-using the Box.
VI.
Now to apply the considerations of the last three sections to a world in
which there is what we might call "properly basic religious pluralism." It is
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relatively easy, if not always edifying or peaceful, for incoherent or inconsistent sets of properly basic beliefs to coexist when they are held by distinct
persons. This coexistence need not entail that one person arrogantly disregards or condescendingly dismisses the other's beliefs-he may simply ignore them, perhaps on the grounds that he is not his neighbor's epistemic
keeper. This toleration via indifference, I take it, may well be our actual
situation. But when divergent properly basic beliefs are internal to-i.e.,
believed by-a single person, the problems grow considerably more acute
and insistent. It is then no longer a matter of reacting to the properly basic
beliefs of others but a matter of reacting to one's own properly basic beliefs,
and this can greatly affect one's sense of urgency. It is of course quite
possible for someone to hold not merely unrelated but even inconsistent
properly basic beliefs, at least so long as one doesn't recognize or care about
the disconnection or inconsistency. But it strikes me as irrational to cling to
supposedly properly basic beliefs which one sees are mutually inconsistent
or incoherent, or, to a lesser degree, which seem to be without any intelligible
interconnection.
Thus, while it may seem easy to cling to one's own distinctive properly
basic religious beliefs in the face of the incompatible beliefs of others, there
are strong pressures against having inconsistent, incoherent or unconnected
properly basic beliefs internal to oneself. But Plantinga's Box makes others'
properly basic beliefs internal to oneself. So if the Box is used, or should be
used, the pressure grows to explore and to resolve any inconsistencies within
the set of religious beliefs properly basic for anyone.32 Not to use the Box
when there are good reasons for using it, and no good reasons not to, seems
to be a tacit admission of error or of lack of confidence in one's own properly
basic beliefs.
My claim is not the epistemic one that incorporation of others' properly
basic religious beliefs is a condition on the proper basicality of one's own
basic religious beliefs, nor is it the moral claim that everyone ought, all things
considered, to use the Box. Instead, I am asserting that for at least many
properly basic Christians there are no good negative and there are some good
positive reasons-though not necessarily over-riding ones-for using the
Box. Such Christians should therefore worry about the apparently incompatible properly basic religious beliefs of others in a religiously pluralistic world.

VII.
Where does this thought-experiment leave us? Its limitations are legion.
For one, it doesn't show us whether different kinds of religious beliefs can
or can't be properly basic, or whether any such beliefs are properly basic.
For another, it doesn't rule out the possibility that different people can hold
not merely different but incompatible or inconsistent religious beliefs, each
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in a properly basic way. All that has been shown is that even if people do
hold incompatible properly basic religious beliefs there are still good reasons
for many Christians to use Plantinga's Box to help resolve the inconsistencies, and there are no overwhelming reasons for them not to do so.
But there is one final worry. Isn't using Plantinga's Box merely a
'theoretical' matter, since there are of course no such Boxes? No. Although
we lack such high-tech Doxastic Deviation Devices, there are more traditional
substitutes-the normal forms of interreligious dialogue: We may, e.g., read
and try to understand each others' stories; we may sincerely speak and carefully listen to one another; we may work together on interpreting sacred texts,
performing sacred rituals and enriching sacred symbols; we may participate
in collaborative work on religious and non-religious projects; and we may
even join for a time the other person's religious community, in order to 'try
on' another's way of life in however truncated and inadequate a form. All of
these are ways of 'copying,' more or less, the religious beliefs of others, and
they raise the very same questions raised by Plantinga's Box.
So, while we may not be Boxed in, we do have the opportunity for interreligious dialogue, and that is enough. If it is not clearly wrong for Al not to
use the Box, and if there are good reasons for him to use the Box, then there
are good reasons for him to engage in interreligious dialogue. Interreligious
inquiry is not precluded, and in fact may be prescribed, for many properly
basic Christians. 33
Washington and Lee University

NOTES
1. Plantinga's position is elaborated in the following articles, among others: "'Is Belief
in God Rational?,~ in C. R Delaney, ed., Rationality and Religious Belief(University of
Notre Dame Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, #1; Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979), pp. 7-27; "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?," NOUS, 15 (March
1981), pp. 41-52; and "Reason and Belief in God," in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas
Wolterstorff, eds., Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief itl God (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 16-93.
2. I am concerned only with beliefs which are properly basic for members of any major
world religious tradition.
3. The device is named after Plantinga because I first heard of it from him, although he
used it to make completely different points.
4. A few other features might be mentioned for the aficionado: CONVERT transforms
belief that p into belief that not-p; it is one form of 'changing one's mind.' TIME is a
timer for other functions; it allows one to set a duration after which the original function
is cancelled, so far as that is possible. CATEGORY allows a function to deal with beliefs
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pertaining to a certain specifiable category; there are 'semantic' and 'syntactic' knobs
here, though perhaps this is redundant. The 'semantic' knob restricts the content of the
belief to a given subject-matter; the 'syntactic' button enables one to specify meta-linguistically the desired range of logical subjects and predicates for the sentential expressions
of the 'objects' of beliefs. An elaborate set of RELATION dials takes two or more
propositions believed and converts them into a new relational belief, in various ways. E.g.,
with the inputs of belief that p and belief that q, one could dial up the belief that p implies
q, or the belief that p is consistent with q, etc. Since the relation function can be reiterated,
one can acquire e.g. the belief that one's belief that p and q are consistent is implied by
the belief that p implies q, and so on. -Once again I must stop, before our epistemic
engine becomes an epistemological tool-factory.
5. We needn't worry about which beliefs they are, for that would involve us in endless
controversies over Orthodoxy, which is not our present concern. If need be we can simply
stipulate that AI is a Christian and that in our thought-experiment we are solely concerned
with his Christian beliefs, whichever ones those are.
6. The formula is Plantinga's; cf. e.g.

~Reason

and Belief in God," p. 17.

7. Once again, worries about which specific Buddhist beliefs Go holds-or even which
kind of Buddhist beliefs he has-are not germane. In fact, all that really matters for the
questions I wish to consider is that Go have some properly basic religious beliefs which
AI lacks and which are neither entailed by nor clearly compatible with AI's beliefs. But
it is perhaps most interesting to make these beliefs non-Christian ones to heighten the
apparent incompatibility.
8. What if Go's properly basic beliefs, when copied into AI, just become AI's beliefs,
but not his properly basic beliefs? Surely a belief that is properly basic for one person
need not be or become properly basic for another person, even when the second person
gets that belief from the first. Plantinga's Box can handle such worries. The COpy
function can be adjusted so that it takes a belief from one person and copies it into another
person in anyone of three modes: (i) as a properly basic belief for the second person, (ii)
as a basic but not properly basic belief for that person, or (iii) as a nOll-basic belief for
that person. Our version of the Box, therefore, for the current run of experiments has been
set in the first mode.
9. Actually there is another set of what might be called parallel ~Buddhist" options for
AI, where AI's original Christian properly basic beliefs are completely excised or retained
only in memory after t2 and his acquired Buddhist properly basic beliefs are either
remembered or actually present. I ignore these options because the experiment is not
supposed to directly make Al into a Buddhist, even if as an unforeseen and indirect result
Al becomes a Buddhist or ceases to be a Christian. I just want to see whether, from AI's
current Christian standpoint, it would be right or wrong for Al to enter into an experiment
where he would encounter-or rather incorporate-Go's Buddhist beliefs without necessarily losing his own Christian properly basic ones.
10. There are other and possibly even more interesting questions which I cannot address
here: For one, independently of whether or not it is wrong to add some properly basic
Buddhist beliefs, would adding them nonetheless be good, commendable, admirable or
otherwise desirable? For another, could participation in the experiment just be a permissible but arbitrary choice, rather like a matter of taste?
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11. Cf. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," pp. 78-82.
12. lowe this point to John Glenn. Incidentally, Planting a is not clear about the kind
of experience needed to ground a properly basic belief. An experiential ground may be
(i) a special experience, an experience with a particular content; (ii) a special kind or type
of experience; (iii) generic or widespread experience viewed or had in a special way; (iv)
an experiential set or readiness to have experience in either of the first three senses; or
perhaps even (v) the "experience" of undergoing the production of the properly basic belief
in a certain way. (Could production of a belief by Plantinga's Box itself count as a ground
for the belief produced?)
13. Of course, understanding the religious like of another person involves much more
than merely understanding his or her beliefs, but we cannot take up these larger issues
here.
14. I am indebted to John Glenn and especially to Bill Alston for insisting on the need
to address such questions.
15. What follows is obviously not a complete analysis of the concept of understanding,
but I hope it suffices for the issue at hand.
16. Cf. Thomas Nagel, "What is it like to be a bat?," Ch. 12 in Mortal Questions
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). In his preface to this volume, Nagel says
that "to create understanding, philosophy must cOllvince. That means it must produce or
destroy belief, rather than merely provide us with a consistent set of things to say" (p. xi).
17. In order to understand even more deeply another's belief in all its rich concreteness,
must you not also come to believe as the other does-e.g., perhaps with her degree of
tentativeness or conviction, or with her associated feelings, etc.? If so, Plantinga's Box
would need further supplementation. But that such a deeper level of understanding is
possible or desirable for some purposes does not detract from the point I am making here
about the need to understand what it is like to hold the religious properly basic beliefs of
others.
18. One might also argue that in order fully to understand S's properly basic belief as
properly basicfor S, one needs not merely to know about but also to possess S's associated
experiential ground.
19. Cf. Donald Evans, The Logic of Self-Involvement (The Library of Philosophy and
Theology; London: SCM Press, 1963).
20. We might not know the odds, or whether gain or loss is greater, until after trying
the Box, and then perhaps it would be too late if we made the wrong choice. Still, one can
be antecedently justified in risking loss of truth in order to pursue (possibly or probably)
greater truth. Much depends upon a subjective assessment of the risks and values involved,
however.
21. Mark Nelson has pointed out to me that unfettered doxastic competition, like
unregulated economic markets, may be both unfair and inefficient due to external or
internal inadequacies. In theological terms, our way may be blocked by Satan or by sin.
22. lowe the forceful expression of this point to George Mavrodes.
23. Note that there are many ways to tamper with a properly basic belief other than
simply deleting it. One simple way is just to add an inconsistent or contrary properly basic
belief and see what happens.
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24. I think this latter is indeed the case with AI's theism and with Go's (and most of
his relatives') non-theism, but I cannot argue this point here.
25. Some complications that can only be noted here: What are the chances of retaining
one's old properly basic beliefs while adding some new ones, or of replacing old ones
with new and better ones? Does it matter how many properly basic beliefs are at risk, as
well as the levels and kinds of risk? Would one be justified in clinging to a single
highly-treasured properly basic belief even though it prevents one from acquiring a large
number of other important properly basic beliefs?
26. These points were suggested to me by Peg Falls.
27. Similar remarks could be made about AI's personal identity and moral integrity in
relation to acquiring Go's properly basic Buddhist beliefs, but there is not space to make
them here.
28. Could someone in such a state still reasonably hold that all of his very diverse beliefs
were properly basic?
29. This way of stating the point was suggested to me by Minor Rogers.
30. I assume here that any two beliefs are commensurable in the sense that either they
are consistent or they are inconsistent-there is no third alternative-so that two beliefs
are inconsistent if and only if they are not consistent. If some beliefs could be incommensurable in this sense, then there might be a weaker sense of the dictum that truth is one:
no two true beliefs are inconsistent (though they need not be consistent).
31. Further, of course, if truth is one in some stronger or more extended sense-e.g., if
all true beliefs must cohere or form a system-then there will be additional incentive for
Al to use Plantinga's Box.
32. Since there are obvious technical difficulties, even with Plantinga's Box, in collating
everyone's properly basic beliefs, it seems to follow that no one has the obligation to do
so. But it doesn't follow from this that no one is under any obligation to explore at least
some other such beliefs, much less that one ought not or need not explore any of them.
33. Earlier versions of this paper were read at the Eastern Regional Meeting of the
Society of Christian Philosophers in Dayton, OH, April 10, 1987, and the Society for
Philosophy of Religion, Charleston, SC, March 3, 1988. For helpful comments and
criticism, I am indebted especialIy to William P. Alston, but also to Harlan Beckley, John
Elrod, Peg FalIs, John D. Glenn, Jr., John Hick, Jim KelIer, George Mavrodes, Mark
Nelson, Ann Rogers and Minor Rogers.

